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COMPARATIVE TAX ASPECTS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN
THE CANADA/U.S. CONTEXT: THE TOTAL TAX BURDEN ON
PEOPLE AND CORPORATIONS: U.S. VIS-A-VIS CANADA - A U.S.
PERSPECTIVE
H. David Rosenbloom
I am going to begin by offering some preliminary comments and obser-
vations on the comparative tax aspects of technological change. My topic
here has a comparative slant to it, and I think I ought to introduce it by saying
that I am quite skeptical about comparing tax systems, particularly about
making comparisons from one particular bias or angle. These usually are
offered in support of an agenda. In a purely intellectual sense, it is close to
impossible to compare tax systems because there are so many variables in
operation. For one thing, although I will speak about the research-specific
provisions in U.S. law, it is clear to me that the biggest influences on taxation
of any activity in the United States, and presumably in any other country, are
the prevailing effective rates. In the case of the United States, we have a clas-
sical system of taxation, whereas Canada has a partially integrated system
with only one level of taxation of corporate profits, which makes for huge
differences in the non-research-specific areas of tax law. So, focusing on the
research-specific areas is not a way to arrive at a proper comparison.
Nevertheless, given the subject matter today, I thought it would be inter-
esting to outline for you what we do in the United States specifically with
respect to the tax aspects of research. My presentation covers four separate
regimes. It is interesting to me, from a U.S. perspective, that the most power-
ful stimulants that we have to research activity seem to be confined to the
multinational arena. In other words, they appear to be most beneficial to tax-
payers who are engaged in cross-border activities.
I want to go through the four regimes and explain to you in broad terms
what we do and where I think each regime fits into the big picture. Two of
these regimes are available across the board, meaning they are not specific to
multinationals. One allows for the deductibility of certain research and ex-
perimental expenditures. That is under Section 174 of the Internal Revenue
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Code.' Our tax laws allow for a current deduction or, at the taxpayer's elec-
tion, a five-year write-off for expenditures that qualify for R&D. 2 Those are
defined broadly as expenditures incurred in connection with a trade or busi-
ness in an experimental or laboratory sense.3 In general, the definition is
fairly liberal.
This tax regime is old. It represents a substantial benefit because these
types of expenditures would be expected to produce multi-year returns. Nor-
mally such expenditures would have to, under U.S. principles, be capitalized.
Section 174 goes back to the 1954 Code. It has taken a bit of a twist lately
because, outside the R&D area, the United States has been focusing on the
dividing line between current deductibility and capitalization.
Mostly, this derives from a Supreme Court case, Indopco, Inc. v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue.4 We have had a number of follow-up deci-
sions in U.S. case law which have encouraged the Internal Revenue Service
to take a rather tough stand in regard to the requirements of capitalization.5 In
that environment, Section 174 looks better than it did when there was not
quite so much pressure on the issue. Indopco has nothing to do with R&D
directly - it dealt with expenses of defending against a takeover6 - but it has
generated a lot of activity generally relating to the subject of capitalizing
expenses. So Section 174 is beneficial, but it is of relatively limited benefit.
As I say, it covers expenditures for research in an experimental or laboratory
sense. It has been extended, although not technically, by analogy to software
development.7
The second general benefit regime is Section 41 of our Code, which pro-
vides for a twenty percent R&D credit against tax." Each dollar of credit, of
course, is worth a dollar, whereas deductions in the United States are worth
thirty-five cents. The R&D credit is available for the excess of qualified re-
search expenses over a base amount. This is a much more recent provision in
our law, and it has been amended several times. In its most recent incarna-
tion, it has been a one-year credit. In other words, Congress rolls it forward
from year to year. It then goes out of existence and Congress has to come up
I See I.R.C. § 174 (1998).
2 See I.R.C. § 174 (b)(1)(C) (1998).
3 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.174-2.
4 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
5 See generally A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 119 F. 3d 482 (7th Cir., 1997); Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
112 T.C. No. 9 (1999).
6 See Indopco, supra note 4.
7 See, e.g., United Stationers, Inc. v. U.S., 163 F.3d 440 ( 7 th Cir. (111.) 1998); Yellow
Freifht System of Delaware v. U.S., 24 Cl. Ct. 804 (1991); Nonvest Corp., supra note 5.
I.R.C. § 41 (1998).
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with the budgetary funds to justify re-passing it. It is frustrating for people
who would like to make long-term plans in the research area, but that is the
way it has been. The credit is an expensive item in the budget, and Congress
has never been willing to authorize it for more than a year, at least not re-
cently. They may have intended for it to last for more than a year, but in re-
cent years it has only been for a year at a time.
The other thing to say about the R&D credit is that it is incremental. That
is to say, if you perform a base level of research from year to year, you will
not be entitled to the credit. The credit is available for twenty percent of the
increment above a base. Computation of the base is very interesting and quite
complex, involving various elections. The most important observation here,
however, is that the credit is incremental, it is not just for engaging in R&D,
and that it is on a year-to-year basis.
The definitions of R&D credit are much more carefully hedged linguisti-
cally than the Section 174 deduction definitions. There are four basic tests to
qualify for the credit. First of all, there has to be a Section 174-type of ex-
penditure. It has to be technological in nature, meaning that it must be hard
science as opposed to soft science. It has to be an expense undertaken for the
purpose of discovering information whose application will be useful in the
development of a new or improved business component. Finally, substan-
tially all of the activities have to constitute elements of a process of experi-
mentation.9
Each of these four tests has its own individual role, and there were pro-
posed regulations issued in early December 1998, which explain the tests. All
of the tests deal with fairly imprecise language, and therefore they are all
subject to interpretation. The Internal Revenue Service has shown itself to be
prepared to engage in controversies all along the spectrum of potential inter-
pretive doubt. Congress has provided for a broad benefit in the sense of a
credit, even if it is only for one year and it is incremental, but the benefit is
couched in language that is susceptible to dispute. There has been consider-
able litigation in this area.
One thing the IRS has tended to do has been to break down research ac-
tivities into very small pieces and argue that those small pieces are not really
innovative and do not qualify for the credit. Any research activity can be
broken down into pieces which, on their own seem trivial, and our tax ad-
ministrators have tended to do that. Also, in order to qualify for the credit,
there is a separate set of rules for internal-use software, which became a big
issue in the United States in 1986. The Revenue Service was very concerned
about internal-use software. A typical case, in which my firm participated,
9 See I.R.C. § 41 (d)(1)(A)-(C) (1998).
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involved Norwest, a bank in the United States.10 They developed software for
internal use, and a number of U.S. accounting firms had convinced financial
institutions and others that these qualified for the R&D credit. Congress
passed a statute in 1986 which said that, in order for this internal-use soft-
ware to qualify, it had to be innovative, had to entail significant economic
risk, and could not be commercially available.' Regulations interpreting
those tests came out in 1997.1
What is "innovation"? What is "significant economic risk?" These issues
are subject to dispute by the IRS, and they can take a fairly tough and nig-
gling attitude. They are not particularly receptive to creative arguments. One
of the unique problems in the United States that always mystifies Canadians
derives from the concept that a partnership in U.S. tax law is a residual cate-
gory. In other words, a partnership is not only an entity described in a piece
of paper that says "partnership" on it. It is any kind of venture where people
come together for a common interest and where expenses and income are
shared. A group of people could easily form a partnership inadvertently, and
there is plenty of case law on that. 3 The tests for the R&D credit are applied
at the partnership level as opposed to the partner level, which is a pretty sure
way, if you have one of these inadvertent partnerships, to be kicked out of
the credit. In addition to the terminology of the statute and the partnership
problem, the IRS has been very tough about requiring records. Basically, the
credit is there as an incentive, but it is very, very circumscribed in applica-
tion, and people claim it at their peril. There is a great deal of litigation in the
pipeline in this area.14
The more interesting benefits for research in the United States are inter-
national, which means that they are probably of only marginal benefit to the
start-up companies about which we were talking in prior sessions. One of the
benefits appears in the cost-sharing regulations under our transfer pricing
rules. Transfer pricing encompasses the rules for supervising transfers of
value between controlled corporations. In the United States, where there is a
consolidated return regime, most affiliated companies file one return. There-
fore, there is no domestic application of transfer pricing, or it is very limited.
10 See Norwest, supra note 5.
11 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 41(d)(4)(E), 100 Stat. 2085 (1986)
(codified at I.R.C. § 41(d)(4)(E)).
12 See 62 Fed. Reg. 81 (1997).
13 See, e.g., Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 7 L.T.C. 521
(1979), affd, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980).
14 See generally Proposed IRS Coordinated Issue Paper on Qualified Research for
Research Tax Credit, Tax, Budget & Accounting (BNA) No. 145 (July 27, 1999).
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Transfer pricing is really a multinational concern, where income or ex-
penses cross borders. The benefit of a cost-sharing agreement is that, if con-
trolled companies get together and contribute to the costs of research in pro-
portions that meet the terms of a qualified cost-sharing agreement, then the
product of the research will be owned, in part, by each of the participating
companies. If you can qualify, it is a wonderful thing because, at the end of
the day, the intangible property developed through the research is owned
throughout the corporate group in the various countries where it is supposed
to be exploited. There is no reason to worry about the correct transfer price
for the use of a related company's intangible property, which is a constant
problem in international taxation in the United States.
The problem with the cost-sharing rules is that their requirements are
difficult to meet. They require ann's-length participation in the agreement in
accordance with the benefits to be obtained by the participants, and the rules
are rather strict. Fortunately, the United States and Canada have both devel-
oped a process called the advance pricing agreement process by which com-
panies can attempt to have their transfer pricing practices approved in ad-
vance." The process is somewhat long and arduous, but it can be a real help
to taxpayers. There have been, I think, 150 advance pricing agreements is-
sued, of which I would guess no more than twenty involve cost-sharing
agreements. But a cost-sharing agreement is a substantial benefit for anyone
who is going to be engaged in an international business. Without cost-
sharing, transfers of intangible property are subject to re-examination by the
IRS, and for that matter, by the tax administrations of other countries, and the
cost of dealing with those examinations can be rather onerous.
The final incentive is also a multinational incentive, namely our rules for
allocating and apportioning deductions. Normally, discussion of this subject
is incomprehensible to people who are not involved in international taxation.
However, this issue involves large sums of tax dollars. Entities in the United
States avoid double taxation by claiming foreign tax credits for income taxes
and taxes in lieu of income taxes imposed by other countries on foreign
source income.1 6 That is the way our credit works. Canada has a completely
different system. We only have a foreign tax credit system, and no exemption
system. One of the ways to maximize benefits in our system is to have as
much foreign source income as possible. The foreign source income concept
is a net concept. You want to maximize your gross foreign source income,
and you want to minimize the deductions that are associated with that gross
15 See Advanced Pricing Agreement Procedure, Rev. Proc. 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 375.
16 See Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17.
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income. Every multinational company in the United States knows these rules
backwards and forwards.
The rules with respect to R&D expenses in the United States have been
an incredible (and seemingly unlikely) political battleground, given a subject
matter that is so difficult to understand. This is another area where Congress
brought forward the law on a year-by-year basis rather than enacting any-
thing permanent. The story really has antecedents going back to 1976, when
the U.S. Treasury put out regulations saying that R&D expenses have to be
apportioned, generally speaking, in accordance with sales. 17 U.S. companies
found that rule quite onerous because it would send a large amount of those
expenses against foreign income, thereby reducing the amount of foreign
source income and reducing the amount of foreign tax credits that could be
claimed. There was such a political battle that, after a few years, many U.S.
multinationals came to the Treasury and said that if the regulations were not
changed, they were going to move all of their research from the United States
to Switzerland or Chad or somewhere else. -
In fact, Congress stepped in, overrode the regulations, and began tinker-
ing with the process of allocating and apportioning the deductions. And after
a number of years, the regulation was rewritten. We now have Section 1.861-
17, which is an extremely generous allocation and apportionment rule. What
it basically does is to carve a slice of these deductions off the top and associ-
ate them with the geographical locus where the research takes place.'8 So a
U.S. company can have anywhere from twenty-five to fifty percent of their
total expenses associated with where the research is - generally speaking, we
are essentially talking about the United States - and the rest can be appor-
tioned under fairly liberal rules either on the basis of sales or on the basis of
gross income. This is a much more favorable way of apportioning deduc-
tions, because income, unlike sales, is very much under a company's control.
The two multinational provisions in our law, the cost-sharing and the
R&D expense allocation, are both very valuable to U.S. companies engaged
in research if they have multinational operations and are concerned about
transfer pricing. For the expense allocation rules to be meaningful, the com-
panies have to have a concern about the foreign tax credit, which presup-
poses that they are paying foreign taxes in some other country.
On balance, in regard to our R&D-specific rules, we in the United States
are not particularly hospitable to R&D in our tax system. The R&D credit is
favorable in name, but the way in which it has been conferred, the language
in which it has been couched, and the attitude of the tax administration in
17 See id.
18 See id.
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applying it have been such to make it a highly problematic benefit. It is there
if a taxpayer turns square corners, but turning those square corners takes a
great deal of effort. Many people have tried to take advantage of this credit,
but the IRS is out there willing to take them to court.
On the other hand, in the multinational arena our rules have been gener-
ous. They are a much bigger benefit to the large companies which are oper-
ating not only in the United States, but also abroad - other companies that
can really take advantage of the expense allocation rules and that are facing
or would otherwise face major transfer pricing concerns.
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